Abstract An overview of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) Network Prototype is given. We present the QKD link devices and the node modules that build up the network and discuss its architecture, functionality and performance.
Introduction
The project ``Development of a Global Network for SEcure COmmunication based on Quantum Cryptography'' (SECOQC) was an Integrated R&D project within the 6th Framework programme of the European Commission, coordinated by AIT. It combined the efforts of 41 research and industrial organizations from the European Union, Switzerland and Russia, to advance Quantum Key Distribution 1,2 , a novel secure communication technology (also known as Quantum Cryptography), and in particular to demonstrate the feasibility of uniting the basic QKD Links into a scalable network communication infrastructure. This step is prerequisite for a broad scale application of QKD both to overcome the principle restrictions imposed by the (current state of) technology such as limited range of operation, and limited bandwidth of transmission, and, more importantly, to allow many-to-many communication as opposed to the intrinsic point-to-point QKD mode of operation. For this reason the most essential output of SECOQC has been the SECOQC QKD-Network prototype 3 . While planning this prototype, in contrast to initial proof of principle QKD-Networks 4-7 , we have initiated a systematic study of the security, the design and architecture of such infrastructures, including relevant network communication protocols. The prototype implementation featured the trusted repeater paradigm (shortly outlined below) which allowed concentrating on the non-trivial core of QKDNetwork functionality, and, additionally, demonstrating the seamless interoperation of a number of diverse QKD technologies. The material is organised as follows. We first present an overview of the architecture of the SECOQC network and its basic building blocks, QKD devices and Node modules as well as the overall prototype topology. We then consecutively shortly present the particular QKD Link devices and the Node modules integrated in the Vienna prototype. We also proceed to outline the basic functionality of the latter. We finally summarise the SECOQC QKD-Network prototype results and outline potential future research objectives in the field of QKD-Networks.
The SECOQC QKD-Network in a nutshell
Quantum Key Distribution aims at Information Theoretically Secure (ITS) key agreement on a pointto-point basis (between two distant locations). The SECOQC paradigm for networked QKD is extending this point-to-point capacity to a full scale network. In this sense a QKD-Network is an infrastructure, which utilizing point-to-point QKD, enables ITS key distribution between any Nodes of (locations connected by) the network. Secure communication between two end points can then be carried out over any communication channel, with a desired degree of protection, employing appropriately the key distributed over the QKD-Network.
While there are different possibilities to realize a QKD-Network, SEQOOC opted for the trusted repeater approach. In the latter, end-to-end secure communication is based on point-to-point transport, protected by the key generated using QKD between connected Nodes. In this scheme it is assumed that the intermediary Nodes are trusted as they have full knowledge of the transported key. Essentially, in the trusted repeater approach, QKD is used to generate key into classical memories, or Key Stores, of two connected Nodes. The arising Key Distribution Network is then based on appropriate interoperation of the Key Stores (Fig. 1) . The origin of the key and in particular the underlying QKD technology is completely immaterial.
A specific problem in a trusted repeater QKDNetwork, and virtually in any QKD Link, is related to the fact that Quantum Key Distribution requires authentic (unjammable) communication, to allow key generation between two locations 1, 2 . There are well known cryptographic means, based on pre-distributed key to ensure communication authenticity. Moreover QKD generation capacity exceeds the amount of key material required for authentication. So, provided initial secret has been supplied to both ends of a QKD Link, it can ensure a key growing functionality. From architectural point of view, this feature leads however to a design problem, which is particularly acute in the network regime. QKD requires key management and key storage to operate properly. It then exports key which also has to be managed and stored to enable a secure communication and/or network wide key distribution. SECOQC lifts this redundancy by concentrating all key management and storage functionalities in a dedicated Node module, which also provides authentic communication channel to the device 3, 8 . This allows simultaneously simplification of the underlying QKD devices providing the technologic means of the QKD Link operation. The resulting QKD Link architecture is sketched on Fig. 2 . The SECOQC prototype features six Nodes connected by eight QKD Links. The network was deployed in the internal glass fibre communication ring of Siemens (a SECOQC project partner) in Vienna, Austria. A geographic map showing the particular locations of the SECOQC network Nodes is shown in Fig. 3 . The Nodes SIE, BRT, GUD, ERD, and FRM were located in the premises of different Siemens dependencies in Vienna (Siemensstraße, Breitenfurterstraße, Gudrunstraße, Erdberger Lände, and Siemens Forum respectively), while the node STP was hosted by a repeater station, near St. Pölten, Lower Austria, on a communication line from Vienna to Munich, Germany.
The network deployment took place in summer, 2008. After a preliminary test period the prototype functionality was publicly demonstrated in the framework of a SECOQC QKD conference held from October 8 to 10, 2008. The demonstration was carried out at Siemens Forum, Vienna, the building hosting the node FRM. It involved One Time Pad telephone communication between FRM and BRT, a secure (AES-encrypted) video-conference with all deployed nodes and demonstration of a number of rerouting experiments, highlighting basic mechanisms of the SECOQC network functionality. QKD devices integrated in the prototype A major effort of the SECOQC project has been concentrated in advancing the enabling QKD technology. This involved an experimental and theoretical focus culminating in bringing a number of very different QKD technologies to a degree of technological maturity and interoperability level, allowing integration and long-term field operation in the prototype. The systems entering the prototype had to comply with stringent criteria, such as:
continuous, stand-alone key-generation rate of more than 1 kbit/s at 25 km over standard telecom-fiber (0.25 dB attenuation per km), full interoperability with the QKD-node, both in terms of key generation (utilization of the classical channel provided by the node) and with respect to providing essential management information to the network. In particular, the Vienna prototype involved eight QKD Links, all mounted on 19 inch racks (see Fig.°4 
QKD Node module and prototype performance
The principal design of the SECOQC Node module was carried out by AIT in close collaboration with groups from University of Aarhus, Telecom ParisTech, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Bearing Point Infonova and Siemens Austria. The technical design and implementation of the module software was realized by a dedicated team from AIT. The basic functionalities of a Node module are threefold:
to enable the operation of all point-to-point QKD links connected to the Node, to manage the key generated over these links, and on this basis, to ensure point-to-point ITS communication connectivity to all Nodes in the network associated to the node by direct QKD Links, to determine a path from the Node to any arbitrary destination node in the network along a sequence of nodes connected by direct QKD links, and, to ensure an end-to-end transport of secret key material along this path These three distinct types of functionalities (or services) can be grouped in network layers: a Quantum Point-to-Point (Q3P) layer, a Quantum Network layer and a Quantum Transport layer 3, 8 .
Out of these the basic SECOQC innovation is Q3P -the interface between the QKD device(s) and the Node module on one side as well as between a pair of Node modules. This protocol maintains the Node Key Store (managing the key material), and a Crypto Engine (performing the crypto operations using key material from the Key Store.
The effective separation between the physical layer and the higher-layer protocols, allows their seamless encapsulation by Q3P. While application of standard telecommunication solutions is feasible, it is certainly not well adapted to the ITS nature of the distributed key material. This led SECOQC to developing the dedicated network and transport layer protocols 3,8 mentioned above.
We are addressing details on prototype performance elsewhere 3, 8 . Here we would emphasize that basically this performance is determined by two unrelated factors -the speed of filling the Key Stores by the underlying QKD devices and their "depletion" as a consequence of the activity of pay-load applications and network traffic for transporting key to remote Nodes (Key Stores). While the first factor solely depends on the performance of the enabling QKD technology, the second is essentially driven by the design and implementation of the relevant QKDNetwork protocols 8 . 
Conclusions
We have given a concise presentation of the general architecture principles of the SECOQC prototype in Vienna -the first highly integrated trusted repeater QKD-Network involving six types of innovative QKD systems constituting eight different links.
Further work in this area should, in our opinion, involve research and development on three frontiers:
Further development of the enabling QKD technology to allow obtaining network-wide key distribution rates that are compatible with (secure) traffic requirements of current and emerging communication network-infrastructures, It is to be reasonably expected that even current QKD-Network performance can significantly be improved by applying adequate traffic engineering approaches. Indeed current networks of this type, being essentially low bandwidth ones, might be an excellent application domain of traffic engineering. While dedicated QKD-Networks (such as the SECOQC prototype) could be highly relevant for selected scenarios -e.g. certain enterprise or government networks, it is essential to prepare the integration of QKD into existing and emerging telecommunication infrastructures. Advances in these fields, together with emerging QKD standardization and identification of relevant use cases, would pave the way for a broad proliferation of the technology.
